AI security statistics 2026: sourced figures with sample sizes

Sourced AI security statistics for LLM applications and agents, checked 9 November 2026. In Cobalt's 2025 survey of 450 security staff, 98% were integrating generative AI and 66% tested it. AI and LLM pentests returned 32% serious findings against 13% overall, and 21.1% of those were resolved. Each figure below carries its source, sample and date, and prompt injection is described as unsolved.

Last updated 9 November 2026. These AI security statistics cover application and agent security: how many organizations ship AI features, what testers find in them, how often attacks succeed and what the standards bodies say is still unsolved. Each figure has its source, sample size and date. We left out breach-cost and shadow-AI statistics that give no sample.

Key figures at a glance#

Seven figures answer most questions about AI application security. All come from the sources named in the table, checked on 9 November 2026. Vendor surveys are labeled as vendor surveys.

Figure Source Sample and date
98% integrating generative AI into products and services Cobalt (vendor survey) 450 security staff, report 2025
66% regularly assess the solutions they build with AI, including pentests Cobalt (vendor survey) Same survey
32% of AI and LLM pentest findings rated serious, against about 13% of all findings Cobalt pentest data Report 2025
21.1% of serious AI and LLM findings resolved Cobalt pentest data Report 2025
540% year-over-year rise in validated prompt injection vulnerabilities HackerOne (press release) Platform data, 18 March 2026, base not stated
Over 76% of SaaS companies use some AI in their products SaaS Capital Annual survey of private B2B SaaS, over 1,000 responses, February 2025
About 1% attack success rate on prompt injection in a browser agent Anthropic Anthropic's own test, 24 November 2025

How did we choose these sources?#

We picked primary reports and kept only figures we could read in the original. A figure from a blog post that cites a report gets traced to the report or dropped. Each row has a named source, a sample or population, and a date.

Three rules decide what goes in. First, a vendor survey is marked as one, because the vendor sets the questions. Second, a percentage without a base (the HackerOne 540%) carries a warning. Third, a benchmark score is tied to the models in the paper, not to current models. We checked each source on 9 November 2026. We excluded figures we could only find in secondary reports, such as ISO/IEC 42001 certificate counts.

What do the statistics say about AI adoption and testing?#

Most surveyed organizations already ship AI features, and most say they assess them. In Cobalt's 2025 survey (450 validated responses, security staff at firms with 500 to 9,999 employees), 98% said they were integrating generative AI into their products and services. About 80% said they were increasing efforts to secure AI, and 66% were conducting regular security assessments, including pentests, of their AI solutions.

SaaS Capital found a lower figure in a different population. Its annual survey of private B2B SaaS companies draws more than a thousand responses, and over 76% of respondents used at least some AI in their existing products and 69% used AI in day-to-day operations. Respondents were typically CEOs, CFOs or other executives.

Measure Figure Source and date
Integrating generative AI into products and services 98% Cobalt, 450 respondents, 2025
Increasing efforts to secure AI About 80% Cobalt, same survey
Regular assessments of their AI solutions 66% Cobalt, same survey
AI in existing products Over 76% SaaS Capital, 16 May 2025
AI in day-to-day operations 69% SaaS Capital, 16 May 2025
Confidence in handling AI security 64% in 2025, 51% in 2026 Cobalt 2026 report, via Cobalt blog

The two surveys use different populations, so do not average them. Cobalt's 98% is for mid-size and large firms that answer a security vendor's survey. SaaS Capital's 76% covers private SaaS companies of all sizes.

What do pentests find in AI and LLM applications?#

Testers rate a higher share of AI and LLM findings as serious than for other test types, and those findings are fixed less often. Cobalt's 2025 report states that about one-third (32%) of findings in its AI and LLM pentests were rated serious, against about 13% of all findings. Only 21.1% of serious AI and LLM findings were resolved, the lowest of the test types shown. Internal network tests resolved 49.6% and desktop tests 36.4%.

The 2026 edition, as summarized in Cobalt's own blog post, gives 32% serious AI and LLM findings against 12% for the whole dataset, and a resolution rate of 38% for AI and LLM high-risk findings, again the lowest of any category. We quote the shares and not the ratio Cobalt prints, because Cobalt's pages disagree on the ratio. We have not opened the 2026 PDF itself, so check the 2026 figures there before you rely on them.

Measure 2025 report 2026 report (blog summary)
Serious or high-risk share, AI and LLM findings 32% 32%
Same share, all findings About 13% 12%
Share of those findings resolved 21.1% 38%
Organizations with an AI or LLM security incident Not reported in what we read 19% (18% "not sure", 19% "prefer not to answer")

The 2026 blog lists the causes of those incidents that respondents named: shadow AI (44%), improper output handling (41%), data and model poisoning (41%), supply chain issues (35%) and prompt injection (34%). Read the share of serious findings with care. It does not say how many flaws a typical AI application has. It says how testers rated the findings they reported in Cobalt's engagements.

How often does prompt injection succeed?#

Defenders report falling but non-zero attack success rates, and no source claims the problem is solved. Anthropic published a figure for its browser agent on 24 November 2025: a 1% attack success rate, which it says still represents meaningful risk. It states that no browser agent is immune to prompt injection. The figure comes from Anthropic's own test setup, so it does not transfer to your application.

HackerOne reported on 18 March 2026 that validated prompt injection vulnerabilities on its platform rose 540% year over year. The release does not state the starting count. A 540% rise from a small base is a small absolute number, so use it as a direction, not a size.

Note

For how an injection works and how testers find it, read prompt injection and indirect prompt injection. Our prompt injection lab measures success rates in our own setup, with the method and the code.

How well do AI agents find vulnerabilities?#

AI agents find real vulnerabilities in controlled benchmarks and competitions, at a cost and rate that depend on the task. DARPA's AI Cyber Challenge final (results dated 8 August 2025) is the largest public test. The seven finalist teams worked across 54 million lines of code, in 63 challenges.

Measure Figure Source
Synthetic vulnerabilities discovered in the final 54, of which 43 were patched DARPA, 8 August 2025
Real, non-synthetic vulnerabilities discovered 18 (6 in C, 12 in Java), with 11 patched DARPA
Average cost per competition task About $152 DARPA
Synthetic vulnerabilities found, final vs semifinal 86% vs 37% DARPA
Found vulnerabilities patched, final vs semifinal 68% vs 25% DARPA
Real-world vulnerabilities in the CyberGym benchmark 1,507 across 188 projects arXiv:2506.02548
Best agent success rate on CyberGym (2025 models) About 20% arXiv:2506.02548
Professional CTF tasks in Cybench 40 from 4 competitions arXiv:2408.08926

The official DARPA text says 63 challenges. Some news sites print 70. CyberGym's roughly 20% success rate applies to the models in the 2025 paper, not to current models. The paper also reports 34 zero-day vulnerabilities and 18 historically incomplete patches found along the way.

These benchmarks test memory-safety bugs and CTF puzzles. They do not test authorization flaws or business logic in your own application. That gap matters for AI red teaming tools and for how you read vendor claims.

What do the standards bodies say is still unsolved?#

Standards and government bodies say prompt injection has no complete fix and that mitigations reduce likelihood and impact. These statements are not statistics, but they bound how to read the figures above.

Body Statement Date
UK NCSC Prompt injection attacks "may never be totally mitigated in the way that SQL injection attacks can be". The best we can hope for is "reducing the likelihood or impact of attacks". 8 December 2025
NIST AI 100-2 E2025, section 3.4.4 Current mitigations "do not offer full protection against all attacker techniques". 2025
OWASP LLM01:2025 "It is unclear if there are fool-proof methods of prevention for prompt injection." 2025
Anthropic "No browser agent is immune to prompt injection." 24 November 2025

Microsoft's AI Red Team paper on more than 100 generative AI products (arXiv:2501.07238, January 2025) makes the same point from practice. One of its stated lessons is that "the work of securing AI systems will never be complete."

A statistic cannot show that a system is secure after testing. A test shows which flaws existed on the test date. See the OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications for the risk list testers work through.

How do I cite these statistics, and when was this page updated?#

Cite the original source named in the table, not this page. Name the publisher, the report, the year, the sample and the figure, and say whether it is a vendor survey. Example: "Cobalt, State of Pentesting Report 2025 (vendor survey, 450 respondents): 98% are integrating generative AI into products and services."

This page was last updated on 9 November 2026. Several figures change each year. Cobalt already has a 2026 edition, and AI benchmark scores change with each model release. Re-check the source before you reuse a number in a document you will keep.

Questions

What is the most cited AI security statistic for LLM applications?

The share of serious findings. Cobalt's 2025 report found 32% of AI and LLM pentest findings rated serious against about 13% of all findings, and its 2026 post gives 32% against 12%. Both come from Cobalt's own pentest data, so they describe its customers, not all applications.

Do these statistics show that AI applications are less secure than other software?

Not on their own. Cobalt measures the share of serious findings per finding, not the number of flaws per application. Newer AI testing may also be scoped to riskier features. The figures show where testers find serious problems, not a total ranking.

Why does the HackerOne 540% figure have no base number?

The press release says validated prompt injection vulnerabilities rose 540% year over year on its platform. It does not state the starting count or the period. A percentage without a base can mean a small number grew fast, so we quote it with that limit.

Can I trust vendor survey statistics?

Use them as indications. Vendors choose the questions and often the respondents. Check the sample size, who was asked and the date. Prefer figures from the original report to blog posts that repeat them.

Sources

  1. Cobalt: State of Pentesting Report 2025 (AI and LLM section, pp. 4, 10 and 11; method p. 31) (checked 9 November 2026)
  2. Cobalt: Top 15 statistics from the 2026 State of Pentesting Report (checked 9 November 2026)
  3. HackerOne press release, 18 March 2026: Agentic Prompt Injection Testing and AI vulnerabilities surge 540% (checked 9 November 2026)
  4. SaaS Capital: AI adoption among private SaaS companies (checked 9 November 2026)
  5. DARPA: AI Cyber Challenge final results, 8 August 2025 (checked 9 November 2026)
  6. CyberGym: Evaluating AI agents' real-world cybersecurity capabilities at scale (arXiv:2506.02548) (checked 9 November 2026)
  7. Cybench: A framework for evaluating cybersecurity capabilities and risks of language models (arXiv:2408.08926) (checked 9 November 2026)
  8. Anthropic: Mitigating the risk of prompt injections in browser use (checked 9 November 2026)
  9. UK NCSC: Prompt injection is not SQL injection (checked 9 November 2026)
  10. NIST AI 100-2 E2025: Adversarial machine learning taxonomy (checked 9 November 2026)
  11. Microsoft AI Red Team: Lessons from red teaming 100 generative AI products (arXiv:2501.07238) (checked 9 November 2026)